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Case No. 20100004
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
SCOTT C. WADSWORTH,

Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for sexual exploitation of a minor, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3 (Supp. 2001),
unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-401 (1999), and enticing a minor over the Internet, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (Supp. 2003). This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to his
counsel of choice when it refused to permit his counsel of record to withdraw
until other counsel appeared in the case?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Standard of Review. A trial court's denial of an attorney's motion to
withdraw as counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Utah R. Crim. P.
36 (providing that "an attorney may not withdraw as counsel of record in
criminal cases without the approval of the court"). "However, courts .. . have
no discretion to allow a violation of a defendant's constitutional right to
counsel." State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 381 (Utah App. 1997). "Absent special
circumstances, a 'defendant's choice of retained counsel must be respected.'"
State v. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, If 17, 206 P.3d 1233 (citation omitted).
2. Did Defendant knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty to the three
charges in this case?
Standard of Review. "A district court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a

(

guilty plea involves both factual and legal determinations, and thus invites
multiple standards of review." State v. Lovell, 2011 UT 36, ! 5, 690 Utah Adv.
Rep. 13. The trial court's ultimate ruling on the motion is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion, and the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id.
However, "'the ultimate question of whether the [trial] court strictly complied
with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness.'" Id. (quoting State v. Beckstead,
2006 UT 42, | 8,140 P.3d 1288). Moreover," [a]n ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, f 20,
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i

Utah Adv. Rep.

. The trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed

for clear error. Id. The court's legal conclusions, including its application of the
law to the facts, is reviewed for correctness. Id. But in doing so, "[judicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A: U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6
(1999) & Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004); and Utah R. Crim. P. 11.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts.
In the summer of 2003, Defendant—who was 34 years old — met 15-yearold A. V. on the Internet. Using the Internet, he sent A. V. child pornography and
arranged to meet with her for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity. When
the two met, Defendant "kissed and fondled [A.V/s] breast" and "she
performed oral sex on [him]/' Defendant admitted to these facts on October 22,
2004 during a plea colloquy and in his Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea ("plea affidavit"). See R71:9-ll; R54-61 (Addendum B).
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B.

Summary of proceedings.
Defendant was charged by Information with enticing a minor over the

Internet, unlawful sexual activity with a minor, sexual abuse of a minor, and
twenty counts of dealing in harmful material to a minor. R.l-8. At Defendant's
initial appearance, the district court appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender's
Association (LDA) to represent him. R10-14. But days later, Defendant retained
private counsel — Barton Warren—to represent him. See R20. On the date of the
scheduled preliminary hearing, the State made a plea offer to.Defendant and the
case was set for a change of plea hearing on May 7,2004. See R36-37a,38-39a,43.1
Second legal opinion regarding State's plea offer
Defendant chose not to plead guilty at the May 7 change of plea hearing,
and the case was set for a two-day jury trial to begin on August 10, 2004. See
R40-42. Defendant advised his attorney, Mr. Warren, "that it was his intention
to at least seek a second opinion and retain other counsel" before accepting the
plea offer. R192 (Addendum C): 3. Three weeks later, Defendant retained
attorney Susanne Gustin. R99 (Addendum D):^fl; accord R192:3-5. On June 17,
2004, she provided Defendant with a written, legal opinion of the case, R99:^[6,

1

The district court clerk did not paginate the third pages of the minute
entries for the February 26 and April 9 hearings. The State will thus cite those
pages as "R37a" and "R39a" respectively.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and concurred with Warren's recommendation that Defendant accept the State's
plea offer, R43:fl.
Counsels' attempts to clarify status of legal representation
A day or two after receiving Ms. Gustin's letter, Defendant spoke with her
about representing him at trial. R99:^f 1; R192:5-7. By early July 2004, Ms. Gustin
notified Defendant that she was "not going to be able to represent" him in the
case, but said she would provide the names and phone numbers of attorneys
who might. R192:6; R99:^|7. When she did not hear back from Defendant, she
notified Mr. Warren of the situation; Mr. Warren left several telephone messages
with Defendant, but Defendant did not respond. See R99:f 8; R192:4. On July 12,
2004, Mr. Warren wrote Defendant a letter asking that he "let [him] know what
was going on" because "[i]t was [his] understanding that [he] was going to be
replaced as his attorney." R192:4.
After hearing nothing from Defendant, Mr. Warren wrote a second letter
on July 20, 2004, again asking that Defendant contact him to let him know his
intentions. R192:4. That same day, the State filed a stipulated motion to
continue the trial. R43-44 (Addendum E). The motion advised the court that
Defendant had not been in contact with Mr. Warren or Ms. Gustin; that Ms.
Gustin had "indicated that she will not represent [Defendant] at a trial in this
case"; that Mr. Warren had "indicated that he will not be prepared to proceed to
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trial as . . . scheduled due to a lack of contact with [Defendant]"; and that the
State could not proceed to trial as scheduled, because a key witness would be
out of town. R43-44.
August 6, 2004 pretrial conference
At a pretrial conference on August 6, 2004, the district court granted the
State's stipulated motion for a continuance and rescheduled the trial for October
26,2004. See R46-47; R192:8-9. At the pretrial conference, Defendant explained
his desire that Ms. Gustin represent him at trial. See R192:5-6. The court told
Defendant that Ms. Gustin had communicated to the court that "under no
circumstances" would she represent him in the case. See R192:5-6. The court
admonished Defendant to "£traighten[ ] out" his legal representation or he
would be representing himself, to which Defendant responded, "I don't want to
do that." R192:8. Upon hearing this exchange, Mr. Warren moved for leave to
withdraw as counsel for Defendant. R192:8. The court denied the request and
ruled that it would not allow Mr. Warren to withdraw "until Ms. Gustin or
somebody else makes an appearance." R192:8-9.
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October 22, 2004 change of plea hearing
In the months that followed, no other attorney appeared as counsel for
Defendant. See R46-53. At the October 22,2004 pretrial conference, Mr. Warren
appeared on behalf of Defendant. See R62-63,71. At that time, pursuant to a
plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to all three charges set forth in an
Amended Information: (1) sexual exploitation of a minor, a second degree
felony; (2) unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a third degree felony; and
(3) enticing a minor over the Internet, a class A misdemeanor. See R51-63,71.
Before accepting the pleas, the district court conducted a rule 11 plea colloquy
and received Defendant's signed plea affidavit, which was also signed by Mr.
Warren as Defendant's attorney. See R71:9-ll,13; R54-61.
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas
Following his plea hearing, but before sentencing, Defendant retained
Peter Goodall of the law firm, Yengich, Rich & Xaiz, who then filed a timely
motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty pleas. R.64-69. After the parties briefed
and argued the matter, the district court denied the motion in a signed
memorandum decision issued on February 8, 2005. R74-128 (Addendum F).
The court ordered Defendant to report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P)
for the preparation of a presentence investigation report and scheduled
sentencing for April 8, 2005. R127.
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Sentencing—5 years later
Defendant did not appear for sentencing and a $20,000 warrant was
issued for his arrest. R129-133. More than five years later, Defendant was
stopped for a traffic violation and arrested on the outstanding warrant. R.13637. The district court thereafter sentenced Defendant to concurrent prison terms
of one-to-fifteen years for sexual exploitation of a minor, zero-to-five years for
unlawful sexual activity with a minor, and 365 days for enticing a minor over
the Internet. R.156-58. Defendant timely appealed. R.159-60.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. Within days after his
initial appearance, Defendant retained Barton Warren to represent him in this
case. After Mr. Warren recommended that Defendant accept the State's plea
offer, Defendant retained Susanne Gustin, who reviewed the evidence and
provided a second legal opinion, also recommending that Defendant accept the
plea offer. However, Defendant asked that Ms. Gustin represent him at trial.
She refused. Although Defendant wished to have Ms. Gustin represent him at
trial, he did not want to represent himself. Accordingly, when Mr. Warren
asked for leave to withdraw, the district court denied the motion, ruling that he
could not do so until Ms. Gustin or someone else appeared. Where Defendant
did not want to represent himself and had not hired another attorney to
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represent him, the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw did not
deprive Defendant of his right to counsel of choice. Moreover, nothing in the
record suggested that Defendant was entitled to retained counsel.
II. Guilty pleas. Contrary to his claim on appeal, Defendant knowingly
and voluntarily pled guilty to the charges in this case. Because he pled guilty
after the 2003 amendment to the plea withdrawal statute, he is required to show
that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. He has failed to do so.
The record demonstrates that, contrary to Defendant's claim, he was not forced
to plead guilty by virtue of the court's refusal to allow7 Mr. Warren to withdraw7.
Had Defendant wished to hire different counsel, the record shows that he had
the funds to do so. Moreover, Defendant attested at the plea hearing that his
plea was voluntary, of his own free will and choice, that he was not subject to
undue influence, and that he was satisfied with the advice of his attorney.
Moreover, this Court should not review Defendant's rule 11(e) claim because
any error was invited.

Additionally, counsel did not provide ineffective

assistance of counsel in stipulating that rule 11 was fully complied with.
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ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO HIS COUNSEL OF CHOICE
Defendant argues that the district court denied his right to his counsel of
choice because he had "fired" Mr. Warren and "the public defenders' office was
counsel that was qualified, able and willing to represent [him]." Aplt. Brf. at 2230. He contends that "the court's insistence that [he] continue to be represented
by someone not of his choice was unjustified and in violation of [his] Sixth
Amendment right to choice of counsel." Aplt. Brf. at 26. He claims that he is
thus "entitled to have his guilty pleas vacated and a new trial ordered." Aplt.
Brf. at 29. This claim lacks merit.
A.

Defendants enjoy a right to choice of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that

"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the r i g h t . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const, amend. VI. Thus, a criminal
defendant who cannot afford an attorney has "the right to state-appointed

" The State agrees that because the deprivation of a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of choice is structural error under United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), a defendant's guilty plea does not preclude
him from challenging on appeal an alleged denial of his right to counsel of
choice. See United States v. Smith, 618 F.3d 657, 663 (7th Or. 2010); United States
v. Sanchez Guerrero, 546 U.S. 328, 332 (5th Or. 2008).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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counsel." Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507,2516 (2011). Another "element of this
right is the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to
choose who will represent him/' United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,
144 (2006). And "[although not stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in so many
words, the right to self-representation—to make one's own defense personally —
is [also] necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment/- Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806,819 (1975). At issue in this case is the Sixth Amendment
right to choice of counsel.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is not absolute. See id. at
151; Wlieat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (holding that "[t]he Sixth
Amendment right to choose one's own counsel is circumscribed in several
important respects"). The accused does not have the right to be represented by
a person "who is not a member of the bar," or who does not otherwise meet a
court's "criteria . . . to argue before [it]." Id. at 151-52. Counsel of choice "must
be free of conflicts or other ethical limitations" — such conflicts cannot be
waived. State v. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, f 42, 206 P.3d 1223 (citing Wheat, 486
U.S. at 159). And, of course, a defendant may not insist on representation by an
attorney he cannot afford or who for other reasons declines to represent the
defendant." Wlieat, 486 U.S. at 159.
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The right to counsel of choice is also circumscribed by the practical
considerations of the trial proceedings. As explained in Gonzalez-Lopez, a trial
court has "wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the
needs of fairness and against the demands of its calendar." 548 U.S. at 152. A
trial court may thus deny a defendant's request to substitute counsel if doing so
"would obstruct the orderly procession of the case, for example, if 'a defendant
attempts to substitute counsel at the eleventh hour or in mid-trial.'" Barber, 2009
UT App 91, f 43 (quoting United States v. Panzardi-Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813,816 (1st
Cir. 1987)). In such a case, refusal to allow substitution of counsel is appropriate
unless the defendant "show[s] good cause [for the change in counsel,] such as a
conflict of interest, a breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable dispute
with his attorney.'" Id. (quoting Panzardi-Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 816) (brackets in
original).
B.

The district court did not deprive Defendant of his right to choice
of counsel.
Contrary to Defendant's claim on appeal, the district court in this case did

not deny him his right to counsel of choice. Indeed, there was never a motion
before the court—in writing or orally —to substitute Defendant's attorney of
record, Barton Warren, with a different attorney. And the district court never
suggested that it would not allow such a substitution. To the contrary, the court
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recognized that it would permit substitute counsel upon his or her appearance
in court. That never happened.
Defendant claims that the district court denied his right to counsel of
choice at the August 6, 2004 pretrial conference, when it denied Mr. Warren's
motion to withdraw. See Aplt. Brf. at 22-23. The motion to withdraw, however,
was not made concurrent with an appearance of new counsel, nor did
Defendant indicate that he had retained or otherwise identified a new attorney
willing to represent him, or suggest that he could no longer afford to hire a new
attorney.
At Defendant's initial appearance on December 22,2003, the district court
appointed LDA as Defendant's counsel in the case. See 11-14. But just days
later, Defendant retained Barton Warren to represent him instead. See R20-24.
The State made a plea offer to Defendant on the day of the scheduled
preliminary hearing. See R43:^|l. Mr. Warren recommended that Defendant
accept the offer and a change of plea hearing was scheduled for May 7,2004. See
R36-39; R43:5fl. Defendant, however, chose not to enter a plea at the May 7
hearing and trial was scheduled for August 10, 2004. See R40-42. He thereafter
retained Ms. Susanne Gustin, who, on June 17,2004, provided Defendant with a
written, legal opinion on the case. R99; R192:3,5.
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Like Mr. Warren, Ms. Gustin also recommended that Defendant accept
the plea offer from the State, R43:^[l, but Defendant requested that she represent
him at trial, see R99:^[7. There is some dispute as to whether Ms. Gustin had
agreed to also represent Defendant at trial, and, at some point, Defendant
conveyed to Mr. Warren that he "was going to be replaced as his attorney/'
R192:4.3 But as conceded by Defendant below, in early July 2004 Ms. Gustin
"told [him] .. . there's no way 111 be able to go to trial" in the case due to her
pregnancy. R192:6. Ms. Gustin so notified Mr. Warren—Defendant's attorney
of record. R192:4. Thereafter, Mr. Warren attempted to contact Defendant on
multiple occasions — by telephone and letter — to find out "what was going on,"
but Defendant did not respond. R192:4.
At a pretrial conference four days before the August 10, 2004 Mai date,
the district court was made aware of Defendant's desire to retain Ms. Gustin as
his trial counsel. See R192. The court, however, advised Defendant that Gustin
had notified it that "under no circumstances was she representing [Defendant]
in this case." R192:5. The court admonished Defendant to "straightenj ] out"
his representation or he would be representing himself, to which Defendant

3

Defendant maintains that his paid retainer covered trial representation,
R192:6, but Ms. Gustin asserts that she was retained "for the limited scope of
reviewing [the] plea offer he had received from the state" and that "no
agreement was ever reached" to retain her services as trial counsel, R99:^fl,7.
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responded, "I don't want to do that." R192:8. His counsel of record, Mr.
Warren, then moved to withdraw as Defendant's counsel given Defendant's
stated desire at that time to hire a different attorney. See R192:8. The court,
however, denied his motion, ruling that he could not withdraw "until Ms.
Gustin or somebody else makes an appearance" in the case. R192:8-9.
The district court's denial of Mr. Warren's motion for leave to withdraw
was well within its discretion. See State v. Dolierty, 29 Utah 2d 320,321,509 P.2d
351, 352 (1973) (recognizing that trial counsel has discretion in granting or
denying a motion to withdraw as counsel). Indeed, the rules specifically
provide that "an attorney may not withdraw as counsel of record in criminal
cases without the approval of the court." Utah R. Crim. P. 35(a)(1). As this case
demonstrates, the rule exists with good reason.
As noted, Defendant made it clear to the district court that he did not
want to represent himself in the case. R192:8. And although he had attempted
to secure Ms. Gustin's services to represent him at trial instead of Mr. Warren,
she had refused. Defendant admitted at trial that Ms. Gustin told him in early
July that she would not represent him due to her pregnancy.

R192:6.

Thereafter, Ms. Gustin so notified Mr. Warren, who tried to then contact
Defendant, but without success. R192:4. She also notified the district court a
month later at the August 6 pretrial conference and the court, in turn, reaffirmed
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that position with Defendant. R192:5. Under these circumstances, it would
have been an abuse of discretion for the court to permit Mr. Warren's
withdrawal.
When Defendant appeared before the court two and one-half months later
for the final pretrial conference on October 22,2004, Mr. Warren appeared with
him as his attorney. See R59,62. And, at that time, Mr. Warren represented to
the court that they had reached a resolution— that Defendant would plead
guilty to the charges in an amended information. R71:2. The district court
specifically asked Defendant whether that representation by Mr. Warren was
correct, to which Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." R71:3. During the two and
one-half month interim between the August 6 pretrial conference and the
October 22 plea hearing, no other attorney made an appearance on behalf of
Defendant. See R48-63. Moreover, Defendant did not suggest at the October 22
plea hearing that he was dissatisfied with the representation of Mr. Warren. See
R71. To the contrary, he attested in his signed plea affidavit that he was
"satisfied with the advice and assistance of [his] attorney." R58.
As the foregoing demonstrates, at no time was Defendant denied his
constitutional right to counsel of choice. Although he was initially appointed
LDA, he quickly retained his then counsel of choice, Mr. Warren, to represent
him. The court honored that choice. It is true that Defendant later desired to
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replace Mr. Warren with Ms. Gustin as his trial counsel. But she declined to do
so. The law is settled that a defendant has no right to counsel who is not willing
to assume representation. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 155 (holding that a
defendant's right to choice of counsel is "[l]imit[ed]... to those attorneys who
are willing, available, and eligible to represent the defendant") (emphasis added);
Barber, 2009 UT App 91, \ 42 (holding that defendant's counsel of choice "must
be willing to represent the defendant").
Defendant now suggests, for the first time on appeal, that LDA was his
counsel of choice. See Aplt. Brf. at 22 (asserting that "the public defenders' office
was qualified, able and willing counsel that could have replaced Mr. Warren");
27 (same). Defendant, however, never made such a claim below. Having failed
to preserve this argument, Defendant cannot prevail on appeal unless he "can
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred."
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11,10 P.3d 346. He has argued neither on appeal,
and the Court should thus refuse to review this claim. See State v. Pledger, 896
P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address unpreserved claim where
defendant argued neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances on appeal).
In any event, nothing in the record supports a claim that Defendant
wished to substitute Mr. Warren with LDA. As noted, LDA represented
Defendant for a brief period at the beginning of the case. However, Defendant
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quickly replaced LD A with Mr. Warren. Later, he asked Ms. Gustin to represent
him in the case. When she refused, Defendant did not seek representation by
LDA. Instead, he sought from Ms. Gustin the names of other private attorneys
that might represent him at trial. See R192:6. And when Defendant later moved
to withdraw his guilty pleas, he retained a third attorney — Peter Goodall, from
Yengich, Rich & Xaiz. In short, but for the brief period at the beginning of the
case, Defendant's counsel of choice was never LDA.

~

Defendant argues that when he became dissatisfied with Mr. Warren, the
district court had an obligation to again inform him of the Sixth Amendment
right to court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants. See Aplt. Brf. at 26.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, Defendant cites no authority that
supports such a proposition. And second, the right to court-appointed counsel
applies only to those criminal defendants who cannot afford an attorney. See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (holding that the right to courtappointed counsel extends to both federal and state criminal defendaints who
are "unable to employ counsel").

Despite Defendant's belated claim of

indigence, he demonstrated a remarkable ability to hire attorney after attorney
throughout the proceedings. First, he retained Mr. Warren; then, Ms. Gustin;
and finally, after entering his plea, Mr. Goodall. Thus, any alleged error in not
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re-advising Defendant of the right to appointed counsel would be harmless
because the record is clear that Defendant could afford to retain counsel.
***

In sum, the district court at all times honored Defendant's right to counsel
of his choice. After LDA was appointed, Defendant quickly replaced them with
Mr. Warren. Later, the court did not block his attempt to retain Ms. Gustin. It
simply ruled that until she or someone else entered an appearance, Mr. Warren
needed to remain as counsel of record. Defendant chose to retain Mr. Warren,
expressed his satisfaction with Mr. Warren's representation, and entered guilty
pleas under the plea agreement. Thereafter, Mr. Goodall appeared on behalf of
Defendant/without impediment from the court. Defendant's claim thus fails.
IL
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEAS WERE KNOWING AND
VOLUNTARY AND WERE TAKEN IN STRICT COMPLIANCE
WITH RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Defendant also argues that his pleas "were not entered in strict
compliance with Rule 11 and were otherwise not voluntary/' Aplt. Brf. at 30.
He argues that the district court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas because (1) he was "forced" to keep Mr. Warren as his counsel in
the case, thereby rendering his plea involuntary, see Aplt. Brf. at 43-47, and
(2) the district court did not strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, see Aplt. Brf. at 31-43. These claims likewise fail.
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In State v. Ruiz, this Court reaffirmed that "trial courts should liberally
grant presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas." 2009 UT App 121, % 22,
210 P.3d 955, cert, granted, 221 P.3d 837 (Utah 2009).4 But as recognized in Ruiz,
" '[t]his liberal-approach language . . . is directed to the trial court's exercise of
discretion/ " and " 'in no way alters' " the requirements for the withdrawal of
guilty pleas under section 77-13-6 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. Id.
(quoting State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah App. 1992)).
Before 2003, section 77-13-6 allowed the withdrawal of a guilty plea "only
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-136(2)(a) (1994). Under this "good cause" standard, a defendant was not required
to show that the plea was constitutionally invalid, i.e., that the defendant "did
not, in fact, enter her pleas in a knowing and voluntary way." See Bluemel v.
State, 2007 UT 90, ^17,19,

173 P.3d 842.

Instead, a defendant could

"demonstrate good cause to withdraw a guilty plea by merely showing the trial
court failed to strictly comply with 11(e)" of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. State v. Lovell, 2011 UT 36, f 69, 690 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. So long as

The holding in Ruiz is currently pending certiorari review by the Utah
Supreme Court. The State maintains that this "liberal" standard for guilty pleas
is no longer valid given the 2005 amendment to section 77-13-6, which is
discussed herein.
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the challenge to the guilty plea was preserved, harm was "presume[d]." Id. at
f 45,69.5
Rule 11(e) —which requires courts to make several enumerated findings
before accepting a guilty plea —is designed "to ensure that defendants know of
their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to
plead guilty." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^ 11,22 P.3d 1242. Nevertheless, a trial
court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does not, in and of itself, render the
plea unconstitutional, i.e.," 'not knowing and voluntary/ " Bluemel, 2007 UT 90,
Tf Tf 18 (quoting Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988,992 (Utah 1993)). Thus,
under section 77-13-6's good cause standard, a defendant was entitled to
withdraw his or her guilty plea —otherwise constitutionally valid —upon the
' v mere[ ] showing" of a violation of the prophylactic provisions of rule 11(e). See
Lovell, 2011 UT 36, % 69.6 In 2003, this changed.
In May 2003, section 77-13-6 was amended. That amendment abandoned
the "good cause" standard for the withdrawal of guilty pleas in favor of the

5

The Utah Supreme Court in Lovell appears to hold that the "good cause"
standard was not replaced until 2005, when rule 11 was amended to include a
showing of harmless error. See Lovell, 2011 UT 36, % 69. This appears, however,
to simply be a mistake given the fact that section 77-13-6 was clearly amended in
2003, not 2005.
6

To the extent this Court's opinion in Ruiz suggests otherwise, see Ruiz,
2009 UT App 121, ^ 21, it is clearly contrary to the holdings of the Utah Supreme
Court, as discussed.
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constitutional "knowing and voluntary" standard: "A plea of guilty or no
contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it
was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a)
(West 2004). Under this revised standard, therefore, a guilty plea may only be
withdrawn upon a showing that" 'the guilty plea was in fact not knowing and
voluntary/" Cf. Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, f 18 (quoting Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992).
Defendant in this case entered his guilty pleas on October 22, 2004. See
R54-61,71. Accordingly, the current version of section 77-13-6 imposing a
constitutional standard for the withdrawal of guilty pleas applies. As such,
Defendant is "obligated . . . to establish not just that the trial court violated rule
11, but that [he] did not, in fact, enter [his] pleas in a knowing and voluntary
way." Cf. Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, f 19 (addressing the constitutional standard as
applied in post-conviction proceedings). Defendant has failed to make this
showing.
A. Defendant's guilty pleas were not rendered involuntary by virtue
of his unsuccessful efforts to retain other counsel.
Defendant argues that he "only pleaded guilty because he did not believe
Mr. Warren would be able to represent his interests at trial and [he] did not
believe he had another option with regard to his representation." Aplt. Brf. at
44. He contends that he "was forced to remain represented by Mr. Warren
despite his lost confidence with his assistance as counsel." Aplt. Brf. at 45. In
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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support of his claim that he was "forced" to remain with Mr. Warren, Defendant
alleges that "he was unable to afford to hire a new attorney" and the district
court "was not going to allow him to continue the trial again." Aplt. Brf. at 4546. Defendant made the foregoing argument in his motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas. See R66-68,74-84. The district court, however, properly ruled that
Defendant had demonstrated "no legitimate basis to allow [him] to withdraw
[his] pleas." R126-27.
As discussed, nothing in the record at the time of the October 22 plea
hearing suggests that Defendant could not afford to hire an attorney. Within
days of his initial appearance, he retained Barton Warren. See R20. Then, after
Mr. Warren recommended that Defendant accept the State's plea offer, he paid a
5,000 retainer for Susanne Gustin, who reviewed the evidence and provided
Defendant with a second opinion. See R99; R192:3-5. At the August 6 pretrial
conference, Defendant also related to the court that in early July 2004, Ms.
Gustin had offered to provide the names of other attorneys that might be able to
represent him instead and that he responded, "that's fine." R192:6. Although
he complained to the court that she never followed through and that he had
J.

^

paid a "hefty" fee for nothing more than a second opinion, Defendant never
suggested to the court that he could not afford another attorney. See R192.
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In light of the foregoing facts, nothing reasonably suggested to the court
that Defendant could not afford an attorney. Nor did Defendant claim that he
could not afford an attorney in his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. See R6668. His claim of indigence did not arise until two and one-half months after he
entered his pleas, when his newly retained attorney, Peter Goodall, filed a
memorandum in support of the motion. See R76; see also R116. This claim,
however, seems disingenuous where he had now hired a third attorney in the
case.
Moreover,

the

court

appropriately

admonished

Defendant

to

"straighten[ ] out'7 his legal representation, and it continued the trial almost
three months — more than enough time for Defendant to settle on an attorney.
See R192:8-9. The record showed that despite repeated efforts by both Mr.
Warren and Ms. Gustin, Defendant did not contact Mr. Warren for five months
and Ms. Gustin for a month. See R192:4; R99. In light of this conduct, the court
appropriately ruled it would not continue the trial based on another last-minute
claim Defendant has not secured counsel. See R192:9.
The record also does not show that Defendant had lost confidence in Mr.
Warren. Although Defendant had attempted to retain Ms. Gustin to represent
him at trial, the motion that Mr. Warren be given leave to withdraw came from
Mr. Warren, not Defendant, and appeared to be in response to Defendant's
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desire to hire Ms. Gustin. See R192:4. Defendant made it clear he did not want
to represent himself and it was equally clear that Ms. Gustin would not
represent him. The court thus denied Mr. Warren's motion to withdraw,
without objection from Defendant.

See R192:8-9.

While it appears that

Defendant would rather have had Ms. Gustin represent him, he did not
otherwise suggest that he had lost confidence in Mr. Warren. See R192.
Finally, and as recognized by the district court in its memorandum
decision denying his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, "there were
numerous opportunities [at the October 22 plea hearing] for [Defendant] to
suggest to the Court that his plea was not voluntary, but the record is devoid of
any such suggestion/ 7 R126. Instead, when the court asked if he wanted to
accept the plea offer of the State and plead guilty to the charges in the Amended
Information, Defendant replied, "Yes, sir/' R71:2-3. Moreover, he admitted to
the factual basis for the plea and confessed that "it.was absolutely wrong" what
he did. R71:9-12. And he acknowledged that he had read the plea affidavit and
understood the rights he was waiving in pleading guilty. R71:13. And in that
affidavit, he attested that he wTas "entering this plea of [his] own free will and
choice," that "[n]o force, threats, or unlawful influence of any kind [had] been
made to get [him] to plead guilty," and that he was "satisfied with the advice
and assistance of [his] attorney." R58.
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In sum, the record demonstrates that Defendant was not forced by the
circumstances to enter his guilty pleas, but pled guilty knowingly and
voluntarily. See Bolith v. State, 2011 UT App 21, f 4,248 P.3d 1008 (holding that
defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty where defendant attested that
he had not been pressured to plead guilty, confirmed that he was guilty of the
crimes, and acknowledged the rights he was waiving).
B.

Defendant has not demonstrated that his guilty pleas were not
knowing and voluntary based on the alleged unpreserved claims
of rule 11 error.
Defendant also claims that the district court did not strictly comply with

rule 11, because (1) "it failed to resolve the conflict [he] had in his choice of
counsel prior to the entry of the plea," in violation of rule 11(e)(1); and (2) "it
failed to inform [him] that if he went to trial he would have the ability to compel
witnesses for his defense," in violation of rule 11(e)(3). Aplt. Brf. at 31-32,34.
Defendant argues that because the trial court did not strictly comply with rule
11, the district court "abused its discretion" in denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas and "this Court must presume harm and. .. reverse." Aplt Brf.
at 38. These claims also lack merit.
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1. Defendant did not preserve his rule 11 claims, but
affirmatively represented that the district court "fully
complied" with the requirements of rule 11, thereby inviting
any alleged error.
Defendant's argument applies section 77-13-6's pre-2003 "good cause"
standard for preserved claims of rule 11 error. This standard is inapplicable for
two reasons. First, as explained, Defendant's plea was entered on October 22,
2004, and therefore, the current, constitutional, "knowing and voluntary"
standard applies. See supra, at 21-23. And second, Defendant's rule 11 claims
were not preserved. What's more, Defendant stipulated that the district court
complied with rule 11. Accordingly, this Court may not reach Defendant's rule
11 claims on appeal under the invited error doctrine.
In moving to withdraw his guilty pleas, Defendant did not claim that the
district court violated rule 11. In his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas,
Defendant argued that they were involuntary because he was unable to
substitute counsel. See R66-69,74-85; R168. For the reasons explained above, the
district court properly denied that motion. See supra, at 23-27. In the motion
itself, Defendant did "submit[ ] . . . that the Court did not comply with the
mandates of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." R68. But this
rule 11 claim was conditional pending Mr. Goodall's review of the October 22
plea hearing: once Mr. Goodall reviewed the recording of the plea hearing, he
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would " either submit further briefing to the Court regarding [the Rule 11] issue
or withdraw this argument in its entirety/ 7 R68. He did the latter.
Seven weeks after filing the motion, Mr. Goodall submitted a supporting
memorandum. See R74-85. Nowhere in the memorandum did he contend that
the district court failed to comply with rule 11. See R74-85. He argued only that
the pleas were involuntary because Defendant "was unable to substitute
counsel."

See R74-85.

Later, at the hearing on the motion, Mr. Goodall

affirmatively waived any claim that the district court did not comply with rule
11: "[W]e stipulate that the requirements of Rule 11 were completely complied
with at the time [Defendant] entered his plea." R168:3 (emphasis added).
Defendant acknowledges on appeal that his rule 11 claims were not
preserved below, but claims that "this Court can [nevertheless] reach the merits
. . . under the plain error doctrine."

Aplt. Brf. at 39-40.

Ordinarily, an

unpreserved claim of rule 11 error may be reached on appeal upon a showing of
plain error. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^f 14, 95 P.3d 276. But in this case it
cannot, because Defendant, through counsel, stipulated that the district court
"completely complied with" rule 11. R168:8. Having affirmatively represented
that the district court complied with rule 11, the invited error doctrine bars
7

Defendant also filed a supplemental memorandum, which merely
provided the form of the second page of the retainer agreement used by
Defendant's second attorney, Ms. Susanne Gustin. See R86-91.
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Defendant from claiming otherwise on appeal. See State v. Winfteld, 2006 UT 4, ^f
14,128 P.3d 1171 (holding that it will " decline [ ] to engage in even plain error
review when 'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to
the [trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings])/ " (citation
omitted).

Because Defendant invited any error, this Court should reject

Defendant's plain error claim.
2. Defendant's attorney did not provide constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to challenge
Defendant's guilty plea based on rule 11 error.
Alternatively, Defendant argues that Mr. Goodall was constitutionally
ineffective when he stipulated that the trial court complied with rule 11. See
Aplt. Brf. at 40-43. This claim also fails.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must satisfy the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). First, the defendant must demonstrate "that counsel's performance was
deficient/7 i.e., that it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness/' Id. at
687-88. Second, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's "deficient
performance prejudiced the defense," i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." Id. at 687,694. Ineffective assistance of counsel will not be
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found unless the defendant "makes both showings/' Id. at 687. Defendant has
made neither.
a. Counsel did not perform deficiently in stipulating that
the district court complied with rule 11 in taking
Defendant's guilty pleas.
Defendant argues that rather than stipulating thatthe trial court complied
with rule 11, his attorney should have instead challenged his guilty pleas under
rule 11(a) and (e). See Aplt. Brf. at 41-42. This claim fails at the outset because,
as noted, it is not enough to establish rule 11 error—the defendant must
demonstrate that he "did not, in fact, enter [his] pleas in a knowing and
voluntary way." Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, f 19. Because Defendant has not even
alleged that the rule 11 violations rendered his plea unknowing or involuntary,
his claim thus fails.
In any event, a review of the record reveals that the district court strictly
complied with the requirements of rule 11. Accordingly, any challenge to the
pleas based on rule 11 would have been futile, and the law is settled that counsel
does not perform deficiently by failing to raise futile claims. See State v. Kelley,
2000 UT 41, \26,1 P.3d 546 (holding that a "[f]ailure to raise futile objections
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel").
Under rule 11(e), a trial court may not accept a guilty plea until it has
made several enumerated findings, the purpose of which "is to ensure that a
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defendant knows of his or her rights and thereby understands the basic
consequences of a decision to plead guilty." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 22,
26 P.3d 203.

When a trial court strictly complies with this rule 11(e)

requirement, there- is "a presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered."
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 11,1 P.3d 1108.
"[D]espite the inflexibility implied by its label, [strict compliance]
. . . allows a flexible approach to determining whether or not a defendant was
informed of his rights" under rule 11(e). State v. Lovell 2011 UT 36, .f 79, 690
Utah Adv. Rep. 13. "Verbatim recitation of the rights listed in rule 11(e) is not
required, so long as the defendant was clearly and unequivocally informed of
the rights he was waiving during the criminal proceeding in which he pled
guilty." Id. at ^ 44. This "can be accomplished by multiple means so long as no
requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record reflects that the
requirement has been fulfilled/ " Id. at % 14 (quoting State v. lAaguire, 830 P.2d
216,218 (Utah 1991)). For example, a district court's rule 11(e) findings may be
based on "questioning of the defendant on the record," Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e);
on "a properly incorporated plea affidavit," Lovell, 2011 UT 36, % 79; or on
"other record proceedings before the trial court that [are] properly incorporated
into the plea colloquy," id. at f 44.
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An examination of the record of the October 22 plea hearing reveals that,
contrary to Defendant's claim on appeal, the district court complied with the
rule 11 requirements.
i.

Attorney Goodall correctly concluded that a rule
11(e)(1) finding concerning unrepresented defendants
was inapplicable because Defendant was represented
by counsel at the October 22 plea hearing.

Defendant first claims that "in violation of Rule 11(e)(1) the trial court
never asked [him] whether he was satisfied with the advice and assistance of
Mr. Warren/ 7

Aplt Brf. at 36. He contends that in moving to withdraw

Defendant's guilty pleas, Mr. Goodall "failed to alert the court that the plea
colloquy was insufficient under Rule 11 since the rule requires that the trial
court ensure [Defendant] is represented by counsel, and the trial court never
asked whether. . . Mr. Warren had represented his interests in this case." Aplt.
Brf. at 41. This claim lacks merit.
" [I]f [in taking a guilty plea] the defendant is not represented by counsel,"
rule 11(e)(1) requires the trial court to find that the defendant "has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel." Utah R. Crim. P.
11(e)(1). The district court in this case was not required to make this finding,
because Defendant was represented by Mr. Warren at the October 22 plea
hearing. See R59,62,71. Indeed, Defendant had made it clear at the August 6
pretrial conference that he " [did not] want to" represent himself in the case and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

had not retained another attorney. R192:8. In light of these facts, the district
court denied Mr. Warren's motion to withdraw as counsel until someone else
made an appearance. R192:8-9. No one ever did. Accordingly, Mr. Warren
remained as Defendant's counsel and appeared on his behalf at the October 22
plea hearing. Moreover, Mr. Warren expressly certified in the plea affidavit that
he was Defendant's attorney, and Defendant attested therein that he was
"satisfied with the advice and assistance of [Mr. Warren]." R58-59.8
Defendant claims that in not inquiring as to whether Mr. Warren was
representing his interests in the case, the district court also failed to comply with
rule 11(a). This claim is frivolous. First, the rule 11(a) requirement is not among
those factors addressed in rule 11(e). See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). Second, rule
11(a) governs the proceedings at arraignment:
Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in
open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the
defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(a). And third, even if rule 1.1(a) applied to Defendant's plea,
the record conclusively establishes that Defendant had a reasonable time to
confer with counsel. As discussed, the plea offer was made by the February 26,
2004 preliminary hearing date and the plea was entered nearly eight months

As explained, infra, at 35-38, the plea affidavit was properly incorporated
at the October 22 plea hearing.
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later. During that time, Defendant not only conferred with Mr. Warren but also
Ms. Gustin. See R36-37a,43,54-61,71,99; R192:3-5.
ii. Attorney Goodall correctly concluded that the district
court strictly complied with rule 11(e)(3), thereby
ensuring that Defendant knew of his right to compel
the attendance of witnesses.
Defendant also claims that the district court"failed to strictly comply with
Rule 11 [(e)(3)] since it failed to inform [him] that if he desired to proceed to trial
he would have the right to compel witnesses in his defense/ 7 Aplt. Brf. at 37.
He contends that Mr. Goodall performed deficiently when he did not alert the
district court to this alleged failure in moving to withdraw Defendant's guilty
pleas. See Aplt. Brf. at 41. This claim likewise lacks merit.
Before a trial court accepts a guilty plea, rule 11(e)(3) requires the court to
find, among other things, that "the defendant knows of .. . the right to compel
the attendance of defense witnesses/ 7 The district court in this case did not
specifically discuss that right during its plea colloquy.

See R71. But as

explained, a trial court's rule 11(e) finding may also be based on "a properly
incorporated plea affidavit.77 Lovell, 2011 UT 36, f 79; accord Utah R. Crim. P.
11(e) (providing that a trial court's rule 11(e) findings "may be based on . . . a
written statement reciting these factors77). The plea affidavit submitted by
Defendant in this case was properly incorporated and "clearly
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and

unequivocally" informed Defendant of his right to compel the attendance of
defense witnesses. See Lovell, 2011 UT 36, ^ 79.
The submission of a plea affidavit is, of course, "only the starting point."
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1313 (Utah 1987). The trial court must ensure that
the rights in question are adequately explained in the plea affidavit. See State v.
Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, W l - 1 6 , 73 P.3d 985 (concluding that the plea affidavit
was insufficient because it was ambiguous in describing the elements of the
offense).

The court must also "establish[ ] that the defendant has read,

understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah R. d i m . P.
11(e). A review of the record reveals that the affidavit adequately explained
Defendant's right to compulsory process and that the affidavit was properly
incorporated at the plea hearing.
On page 3 of the plea affidavit, Defendant acknowledged his right to
compulsory process:
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a
trial, I could call witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to
obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear,
the State would pay the costs.
R56. The plea affidavit thus "contained] [a] statement[] that clearly and
unequivocally instructed] the defendant," Lovell, 2011 UT 36, ^ 39, of his "right
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses," as required under rule 11(e)(3).
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Moreover, the affidavit was properly incorporated at the plea hearing.
First, after establishing that a plea affidavit had been prepared, the district court
verified with Defendant's attorney that he had reviewed it with Defendant and
that the attorney believed Defendant understood it:
Court: And you've discussed this matter with your
client, Mr. Warren?
Def. Counsel: Yes, your Honor.
Court: Do you believe he understands the contents of
the document that's there in front of him?
Def. Counsel: I do.
R71:3. In signing the plea affidavit, Defendant's attorney also attested that he
knew Defendant had read the affidavit or that he read it to him, and again
expressed his belief that Defendant "understands the meaning of its contents."
R59.
The district court also verified with Defendant during the plea colloquy
that he had read the plea affidavit and understood the rights explained in it:
Court: Anything you've read about in the statements in
front of you that you do not understand?
Defendant:

No, I understand them.

R71:13. Then, after asking counsel for both parties whether they had any further
inquiries, the district court said to Defendant, "[Y]ou may sign the statement if
you choose." R7T.13. The Defendant did so. See R71:13; 59. The district court
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thereafter accepted Defendant's guilty pleas and found that they were "freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made." R61; R71:13-14.
***

In sum, the record before the trial court in this case, consisting of the plea
colloquy and the properly incorporated plea affidavit, "contained] statements
that clearly and unequivocally instruct[ed] the defendant of the rights listed in
rule 11(e)." See Lovell, 2011 UT 36, t 39. Mr. Goodall, therefore, reasonably
concluded that the trial court "fully complied" with rule 11 and thus did not
perform deficiently when he.so stipulated at the hearing on the motion to
withdraw the guilty pleas.
b. In any event, Defendant has not demonstrated that absent
the alleged error, the result would have been different.
Because counsel did not perform deficiently, this Court need not reach the
prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. See Stiickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (holding
that "there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim... to
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one"). Nevertheless, a review of the record reveals that Defendant
has likewise failed to demonstrate prejudice.
In claiming prejudice, Defendant argues that "there is a reasonable
probability that had the noncompliance with Rule 11 been brought to light, the
trial court would have allowed [Defendant] to withdraw his guilty pleas." Aplt.
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Brf. at 43. That is the sum and substance of Defendant's prejudice claim. It fails
for several reasons. First, Defendant's prejudice claim is inadequately briefed.
It is a bald assertion of prejudice bereft of analysis or citation to legal authority.
This Court will not address such inadequately briefed claims. See State v.
Nielsen, 2011 UT App 211, % 5, 257 P.3d 1103 (holding that "this court will not
address issues that are inadequately briefed").
Second, Defendant's articulation of the prejudice inquiry is incorrect.
Defendant frames the prejudice inquiry as focusing on the probability of success
on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas had counsel raised the rule 11
claims. See Aplt. Brf. at 43. But that is not the proper focus of the prejudice
inquiry. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court almost two decades ago,
"[wjhere a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel, he or she must show a 'reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, lie would not have pleaded guilty and would liave insisted on going to
trial: " Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Hill v. Lockliart,
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)) (emphasis added); accord Dean, 2004 UT 63, | 22.
Third, Defendant has not made the required showing of prejudice.
Nowhere has Defendant claimed that but for the alleged failure to advise him of
his right to compulsory process, he would not have pled guilty. And indeed, to
do so would not have been rational —by pleading, he averted the risk of being
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found guilty of 20 third degree felony counts of dealing in harmful material to a
minor. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473,1485 (2010) (holding that a in a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner "must convince the court
that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances").
In sum, Defendant has failed to meet either prong of the Strickland test for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He has demonstrated neither deficient
performance nor prejudice. Accordingly, his ineffective assistance claim fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted October 19, 2011.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

*Y S. GRAY

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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ADDENDUM A
Relevant Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules
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U.S. Const, amend. VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1994)
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to
conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court.
•(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is
made by motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry
of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned
person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004)
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to
conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon
leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except
for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before
sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless
the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to
withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading
guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time
period specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title
78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

A-l
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Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (2004)
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall
be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in
open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the
defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant
may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of
insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation
fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of
the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall
forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be
given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the
court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for
making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court
has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right
to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront
and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right
to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering
the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of
the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is
A-2
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otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the
minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a
plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing
any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is
limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on
the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after
the court has established that the defendant has read, understood,
and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the
statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral
consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the
ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 1113-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other
party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea
to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the
agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court,
the court shall advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to
any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the
judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the
A-3
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tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for
tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will
be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not
be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the
defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or
withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution,
a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and
mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on
appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination
of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on
appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in
addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a
hearing within a reasonable time to determine if the defendant is
mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.

A-4
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ADDENDUM B
Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel
(R54-61)
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i

••HIS USTUCT G i l l ]
Third Judiolaf DSstrSct

OCT 2 2 2004

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTEFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. /) ? T7f)*»/p'3 €>

vs.
0,
Defendant.

I, Hdcrf'/''i
/A<Mf)^i4//)&f/heTQby acknowledge and certiiy that I have been
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree

z

A.

<&

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

7m' ry/e.fj'^q
B.

C.
^jimi

fri'^

+ 4,/j@/0£££

D.

l
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I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest).
The_elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty, (or nacontest) are:

/Jmc<fA

J

/r?4kn?j$J^ /k/^/nr-M/^r

AJ/A/J^ /D/A/PA

0F /9/H

/=z>/g.. rite /yi/b&s

'A- AJhQ^ &rf

/ftrfrTZu*

/?/^ &xirfhL /bO?z&4r -

PffcvsJ*

Thtr^, &»'^fe¥rr^(^'0

/^fp^Tlv^/d^-

fl-f /hyp*** /J/rr& T2fc /k/rt&r-TO
fiXhsSz.
^f'M^^/h^ATjne^r^
/hjn n^ /HhJeA to/jfx A/tor'tirc Qth**rty M/M- MA//)/A •//»
Y^
I understand that by pleading^guiltyT%ill be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept niy guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or
ng contest):

•iif&S &hin *frm?/?!/?7., /$V ^Ajti&jA/U
/h \/f ~fZ/ &A/&&n&> /A/

2/g'x/Mh^

Yr~ TIP /9-/7?/A/P^: '

/Qry~/i//7^

t</s/?rti

Ajfe

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
»

•

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
.
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's service to me.
I (have not)«{?have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel,
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and ciimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is,m^p^J\/
J4J&£$£,k/.
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a
trial, a) I would have therightto see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would
pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead unot guilty," and my
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law3Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand that if I wish
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is
entered.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.
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Plea agreement. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:
.
i/L^

>S

Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with die advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am<2£2 years of age. I have attended school through the / Z^ grade. I can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drag, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

58

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the PostConviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. ^ ^ / ^ L .
Dated this

'-itay of.

•

a^^

,/jSfc^

• •

ilGFA

DEFENDANT

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney ioi.QC^ff
^> /^//f^^tJlj^m
defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of u±t crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in^fEe foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

F0RT5EFENDANT
Bar No: 7 7 1 7

ATTSEHEY
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
3& )X \J^A Afa^ JNJ^N
, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.
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Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's gui)
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered:
Dated this

(er no contest)-ftlea(s) to the

2^" day of _ 0C7C&CK

Form revised 6/25/03
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ADDENDUM C
August 6,2004 Pretrial Conference Transcript
(R192)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 031908633 FS
Appellate Case No. 20100004

Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOTT C. WADSWORTH,
Defendant.

MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL AUGUST 6, 2004
BEFORE
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURT*

NOV 2 3 2010

'XQlQOOQV-M
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT T R A N S C R I B E R . ^ „ m i C T c i s l i T
1775 East Ellen Way
Third Judicial District
Sandy, Utah 84092
NOV 2 2 2CS0
801-523-1186
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - AUGUST 5, 2004
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. WARREN:
please?

Can we call the Scott Wadsworth matter

I believe it's number 18.
MR. PARKER:

Paul Parker for the State.

MR. WARREN:

Barton Warren on behalf of Mr.

Wadsworth who is present.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Just a minute.

Utah vs. Scott C. Wadsworth, 031908633.
trial.

It's on for pre-

We have a trial set for next Tuesday.

a stipulated motion to continue.
MR. WARREN:

The State of

I see. there's

What's all this about?

Your Honor, what's happened, I can

give a thumbnail sketch, but essentially what's happened is
we were here for an anticipated change of plea back on the
7th of May. After that hearing, I was advised by my client
that it was his intention to at least seek a second opinion
and retain other counsel.

As the motion indicates, he

subsequently retained Suzanne Gustin.
THE COURT: She says it didn't.
MR. WARREN:
THE COURT:

Pardon me?
Ms. Gustin says she was never retained

to represent him in this case.
MR. WARREN:

Well, Ms. Gustin contacted my office

and discussed the case with me and it was my understanding

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

that she had been retained.

2

Honor.

3

received a telephone call - a telephone message from M s .

4

Gustin indicating that Mr. Wadsworth had not been in contact

5

with her.

I don't know.

I'm not privy to that, Your

What I do know, Judge, is that I later

I asked him what we should do.

I subsequently

6 J left him a couple voice mail messages for Mr. Wadsworth.
wrote to him.

I

When I received no response to those, I wrote

to him on the, first the 12 th of July indicating that he
-3-J

should---le-t~me-taow--what---was--g-oi-n-g--on--.

It- was--my--

10 J understanding that I was going to be replaced as his attorney
11 I and then I wrote to him again on the 20 th of July indicating
12

the same thing.

I had not heard from Mr. Wadsworth -

13

THE COURT:

14 I

MR. WARREN:

Did Mr. Wadsworth contact you?
Mr. Wadsworth and I had the first

15 I conversation since May 7th about 36 hours ago, Wednesday
16

evening.

17
18

THE COURT:

Okay.

So he hasn't bothered to stay in

touch with you on this - these multiple charges.

19 I right.

Yeah?

All

Well, the State's the one that wants the continuance.

20

MR. WARREN:

Yes, Your Honor.'

21

MR. PARKER:

Thank you, Your Honor.

This is Mr.

22

Kendall's case.

I believe he outlined some of the reasons

23

including that he has the case manager gone and unable to be

24 I at trial. Mr. Kendall also has left the state
25

[inaudible].

THE COURT: I'm aware of that.
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MR. WARREN:

Your Honor, my client indicates to me

that he has signed a retainer agreement with Ms. Gustin and
he can elaborate. I'm not privy to that obviously.

It's my

understanding that she was going to replace me as counsel.
THE COURT:

Let me see it.

MR. WADSWORTH:

I didn't bring it with me, Your

Honor.

But I did - I retained her back on May 24th, just

o o v o x. a. JL

w<3<3.rvo

Q I L C I

THE COURT:

Well, why would Ms. Gustin call this

court and explain to my clerk that under no circumstances was
she representing you in this case?
MR. WADSWORTH:

Well, originally what she was going

to do was as Mr. Warren has stated, we were going to - I - I
wanted to see some evidence and we had a conversation about a
month and a half ago.
THE COURT:

She had given me her recommendations I don't care about any of that.

Why

would Ms. Gustin call this court yesterday and say that she
did not represent you if you signed a retainer agreement with
her?
MR. WADSWORTH:

Well, I have it at home.

I could

bring it back to - I mean, I didn't realize THE COURT:

Where is she?

MR. WADSWORTH:
THE COURT:

What's that?

If she's representing you, I don't see

her here.
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MR. WADSWORTH:
in court today.

No, she said she would not appear

That's what she -.we had a conversation

several days ago and I said - I said, well - what she told me
a month ago she says - she says I am, you know, she's
pregnant obviously and she says there's no way I'll be able
to go to trial on this on the 6th or rhe 7th, whatever today
is.

And I said, Well, gosh, if I had known that, you know,

why didn't you tell me that to begin with?
she was pregnant.

I - I couldn't tell.

what am I going to do here, you know?

I didn't realize

And I said, Well,
She said I'm not going

to represent - I'm not going to be able to represent and then
she says, let me give you some phone numbers of some people
in my office, you know, her associates.

I said that's fine.

She never called me back with any names and I get in contact
with her several days ago and I says, you know, what are we
going to do?

We got to go to court in a few days.

I, you

know, I'm kind of left hanging here and really I paid her a
hefty fee and retained her for things that we had agreed upon
and she was supposed to contact Bill Kendall probably over a
month ago because I wanted to look at some evidence that was,
you know, the evidence against me, and she never called me
back again a±.ter tu&t poini.
THE COURT:

Get on the radio and see if Ms.

Gustin's in the courthouse.'
THE BAILIFF: So you want to have a [inaudible] on
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Ms. Gustin?
MR. WADSWORTH:
THE COURT:

But I do have a signed contract.

Be quiet. Not getting any response?

THE BAILIFF: Not any response, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

Do you have something else

you want to say?
MR. WADSWORTH:

Well, I'm just saying I - I did

retain her and I nave the checks to prove it.

I have the

contract that I signed and, you know, and I waited for after she gave me her recommendation back on - I contacted
her within days of that, in fact, probably the next day.
THE COURT:

Well -

MR. WADSWORTH:

But I contacted her last night.

Yeah, it was June 17th, we had conversations a day or so
after that after I received her letter.

And I said, Well,

you know, I'd like to see the evidence.

And she said, Well,

I've got to get a hold of Bill Kendall and that was the last
that I heard from her.
call me with that date.

You know, and I waited for her to
You know, I assumed that's what we

•were going to do and as the time grew near.

Barton email -

or sent me a letter in the mail, and that's when I said, you
know, when I called and said, Hey, what's going on, you know,
I - Mr. Barton knew that we were working all along.

She

contacted him within several days after I retained her.
don't know why she's saying I haven't retained her.

I

She's
7
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been paid in full.
THE COURT:

I don't know, but you better get it-

straightened out, Mr. Wadsworth.
MR. WADSWORTH:

And I definitely want to.

She was

supposed to contact me back THE COURT:

You better do more than want to or

you'll be here representing yourself.
MR. WADSWORTH:
THE COURT:

I don't want to do that.

Well, the only reason I'm going to

continue this is the State requested it, and I'm not
impressed with the State's reasons either, but obviously no
one is prepared to go to trial.
MR. WARREN:

Your Honor, in light of these

developments, it would be my motion for leave to withdraw.
THE COURT:

No, you may not withdraw until

somebody's in.
MR. WARREN: I understand.
THE COURT: Let's set a new trial date today.

End

of October - October 2 6th.
MR. WARREN:
THE COURT:
MR. Pxn,RKER:

October 26, Your Honor?.
Uh-huh (affirmative).
That would be fine with the State.

THE COURT: . Works on your calendar, Mr. Barton?
MR. WARREN:

Yes, Your Honor.

Warren is my last

name, sir.
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1 I

THE COURT:

Well, I'll set another pretrial for the

2 I 22nd of October at 9:00.
3 I

MR. WARREN:

Trial was at 9:30 or 10:00, Your

Honor?
THE COURT:

9:30.

MR. WARREN:

Was that 9:00 on the 22nd, Your Honor?

THE COURT:

Yes, this calendar. Mr. Barton in view-

MR. WARREN:
THE COURT:

Warren, Your Honor.
- Mr. Wadsworth had some arrangement in

this case and I'm not letting you out of this case until Ms.
Gustin or somebody else makes an appearance because I'm not
continuing this [inaudible] but anybody down here on the 22nd
or the week before so I know we can't try this because I
don't have a lawyer.

Or if that's the case, I'll just make

the determination that Mr. Wadsworth's not cooperating with
his attorneys and I'll take him into custody and he'll set in
jail until we try the case. Do I make myself clear?
MR. WADSWORTH: Yes, sir.
MR. WARREN:
. . THE COURT:
MR. WARREN:

Yes, Your Honor.
Trial for next Tuesday is stricken.
Thank you, Your Honor.

That's all I

have this morning.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
-c-
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CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in
the before mentioned proceeding held Judge Timothy Hanson
was transcribed by me from an audio recording
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the
requested proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to
the best of my ability.
Signed November 3, 2010 in Sandy, Utah.

Carolyn'Erickson
Certified Shorthand Reporter
Certified Court Transcriber
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ADDENDUM D
Affidavits of Susanne Gustin-Furgis and Scott Wadsworth
(R99,H5-16)
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AFFIPAVtrOFSUSANWEGUSTlN-FCrRGTS
STATE V. SCOTT WADSWORTH
1. I was hired on May 27,2004 lo represent Scott Wadsworth for the limited
scope of reviewing a pica offer he had received from ihc state to settle his
case.
2. i was aware that Barton Warren was his attorney-of-record an the ease. Mr.
Wadsrwotth was informed that b&cause of Mr. Warren'K stains as his ^ftjShicyftf-record, I would have to inform Mr. Warren of my role in the case,
inform Mr. Warren that I would be reviewing the case in %HL of Lhe plea offer
by the stale,
3. On May 27, 2004, "Mr. Wada worth and 1 signed a standardized fee agreement
The agreement reflects our understanding that the amount of S5.000 was a
"flat fee.'1 The amount was not. a "retainer/" which is also reflected ill the fee
ajrarmoril.
4. Beeauae of all of the above, I did not file an ttppearanccf uf counsel hi the case,
5. Written and oral correspondence with Mr. Wadswoith redacted the limited
seope of my representation in the case,
6. On June 17, 2004,1 provided to S wli Wfcdsworth a written analysis of his
caae and also provided a legal opinion about the case.
7. Mr. Wads worth did desire to further retain my services as trial counsel on the
matter, but no agreement was ever reached or znujr&l into between Mr.
Wadsworlh aa<l xne,
8. The last contact I had with Mr. Wadsworth on this case was in July of 2004.
DATED tki^P^day of January, 2005.

SIIJ*!fffi GUSIIN-PURGIS

f

3

'*ld
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PETER D. GOODALL #9718
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320

FES

- 7 2005

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SiAibOl^ UlAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOTT WADSWORTH

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 031908633
SCOTT C. WADSWORTH,
Defendant.

JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Scott C. Wadsworth, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

My name is Scott Wadsworth. I am over 18 years of age and fully competent to

testify as a witness at trial. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.
2.

I had retained Barton Warren, Attorney at Law, to represent me in the instant case.

3.

As the case progressed, I lost confidence in Mr. Warren's ability to represent my

interests at trial.
4.

I then attempted to retain Susanne Gustin-Furgis to represent me through the

remainder of the case.

1
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5.

The attached "Fee Agreement" was entered into between Susanne Gustm-Furgis

and myself.
6.

The first page of said "Fee Agreement" is a true and correct copy of the document

I received from Ms. Gustin-Furgis.
7.

The second page is not executed but otherwise details the remainder of the

agreement.
8.

I am unable to locate the second page of the agreement as executed.

9.

I understood that Ms. Gustin-Furgis would represent me in the Third District

10.

I paid Susanne Gustin-Furgis $5,000 for her representation and was unable, until

Court.

recently, to afford to pay another retainer.
DATED this^T^" day of February, 2005.

SCOTT WADSWORTH

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

t1^ day of February, 2005.

My Commission Expires:

M&^kk
l & m
11B8M

MOTOY PUBLIC -STATE OFUTMt
175 E*ST400 SOUTH 5TE4Q&
* SALT LAKE CITY UTWIU
fcfa, rnmm. EXP. 03/30/2007 _

x u + n ^ r B ^ u i ^ ^ ~JA .CU.. ~~*A n
i uunv^ ^LLLanu i u i ^aiu ^ u u i u j cuiu o u u c
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ADDENDUM E
Stipulated Motion to Continue
(R43-44)
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:

DAVIDE.YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake Comity
WILLIAMK. KENDALL, 7906
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

' •'
(jq j r p g •->•• ~.
\'U*

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATED MOTION TO CONTINUE
Case No. 031908633
Hon. Timothy R. Hanson

-vsSCOTT WADSWORTH,
Defendant.

WILLIAM K. KENDALL, attorney for plaintiff, moves this court to continue the Jury
Trial in the above-entitled case which is set for the 10th day of August, 2004, at 9:00 AM, for the
following reasons:
1.

Both parties have anticipated that this matter will resolve via a negotiated plea
resolution. The defendant is represented by Mr. Barton Warren and waived his
preliminary hearing based upon a plea offer made by the State. The defendant
then hired Susanne Gustin-Furgis to offer him a second opinion with regard to
the plea offer made by the State, and both Ms. Gustin-Furgis and Mr. Warren
have recommended that the defendant accept the State's plea offer. However,
despite numerous contact attempts, the defendant has not been in touch with
his attorneys or the State to indicate his decision with regard to the plea offer.

2.

Ms. Gustin-Furgis has indicated that she will not represent the defendant at a
trial in this case, and Mr. Warren has indicated that he will not be prepared to
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proceed to trial as it is currently scheduled due to a lack of contact with the
defendant and, thus, an inability to prepare for that trial.
3.

The State also will be unable to proceed to trial as currently scheduled due to
the fact that it's case manager, an essential witness in this trial, will be out of
town during the currently set trial dates.

4.

The State's attorney has spoken with Mr. Warren and he stipulates to this
Motion to Continue the Jury Trial.

DATED this 19th day of July, 2004.
DAVID E.YOCOM
District Attorne

XIAM K. KENDALL
Deputy District Attorney
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ADDENDUM F
Memorandum Decision and Order
(R123-28)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
:

vs.

CASE NO. 031908633

:

SCOTT C. WADSWORTH,

:

Defendant*

:

Before the Court is the defendant's Motion to Withdraw his
plea of guilt as entered to the Amended Information on October 22,
2004.

On that date, the final pretrial before the scheduled trial

the following Tuesday, the defendant entered guilty pleas to Sexual
Exploitation of a Minor, a Second Degree Felony; Unlawful Sexual
Activity with a Minor, a Third Degree Felony; and Enticing a Minor
Over the Internet, a Class A Misdemeanor.

After reviewing the

defendant's written statement wherein the rights that he was giving
up as a result of his guilty plea were outlined, and the Court's
oral colloquy with him, the Court accepted those pleas and struck
the trial date.

Prior to sentencing, the defendant obtained new

counsel and filed a Motion to Withdraw his plea.

That matter was

last before the Court on February 7, 2 005, wherein the Court
received Affidavits stipulated between the parties as admissible,
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STATE V. WADSWORTH

PAGE 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

and evidence in conjunction with this Motion to Set Aside the
guilty pleas as being given involuntarily.
Originally, the defendant questioned the adequacy of the Rule
11 colloquy, but withdrew that argument prior to oral argument on
this matter.
The defendant now asserts that his plea was involuntary,
because he had lost confidence in his attorney, Barton Warren, and
was under the impression that attorney Susanne Gustin-Furgis would
be representing him at trial.
Current counsel for the defendant argues that even while the
plea colloquy indicates that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly
and without coercion of any type entered his plea of guilty, that
he ought to be able to withdraw his plea based upon his unstated
dissatisfaction with his attorney, Barton Warren.

After hearing

argument of counsel, the Court took the matter under advisement to
examine the videotape of the August 6, 2 004, hearing where the
Court discussed the issue of Ms. Gustin-Furgis1 representation of
the defendant and continued the then-set trial date of August 6,
2004, to October 26, 2004.
.In reviewing the videotape of the proceedings on August 6,
2 004, it is clear that the defendant, at least up to that point in
time, was under the impression that he had retained Ms. GustinFurgis to represent him.

At that point in time, she had not made
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STATE V. WADSWORTH

PAGE 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

an appearance, no one produced a retainer agreement, and Ms.
Gustin-Furgis had contacted the Court's clerk advising that she did
not represent Mr. Wadsworth in these proceedings, but was only
hired to provide him with a second opinion in relation to a plea
offer that had been suggested by the State.
While there certainly may have been some confusion regarding
Mr. Wadsworth's understanding of whether or not Ms. Gustin-Furgis
was going to represent him prior to the August 6, 2004, pretrial
hearing, there could not have been any misunderstanding in Mr.
Wadsworth's mind following that hearing.

It was related to him by

the Court that Ms. Gustin-Furgis had advised the Court that she did
not represent him. Mr. Warren's request to withdraw was refused on
the basis that new counsel had not appeared, and that unless new
counsel appeared, he would not be allowed to withdraw in view of
the then-new trial date setting of October 26, 2 004.

The Court

specifically advised Mr. Wadsworth that he needed to resolve his
concerns regarding representation before the October trial setting,
because the Court would not be inclined to continue the matter once
again.
Thereafter, nothing occurred until two working days before the
trial, that is, the second final pretrial conference, when the
Court was advised that there was a plea arrangement struck between
the State and the defendant, Mr. Wadsworth.

The State offered an
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STATE V. WADSWORTH
Amended

Information

PAGE 4
which

the

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Court

accepted,

to

which

the

defendant did not object, and ultimately, after an exchange between
the Court and Mr. Wadsworth regarding the rights that he was giving
up if he decided to waive his right to trial and enter a guilty
plea, this Court accepted those pleas and set the matter

for

sentencing.
A review of the transcript of both the plea colloquy and the
hearing on the August 6, 2 004, pretrial do not reveal that Mr.
Wadsworth

ever

expressed

any dissatisfaction,

generally, with Mr. Warren.

specifically

or

Certainly, he did not at the change of

plea hearing express in arly fashion to the Court that he was
offering the plea because he felt that he had no alternative, or
that he was dissatisfied with the representation he had received
from Mr. Warren.

It is only now, after the fact, that Mr.

Wadsworth suggests to this Court that he had lost confidence in the
early part of the summer of 2 004 with Mr. Warren, and that he still
had no confidence in Mr. Warren in October of 2 0 04, and entered his
plea because he didn't think he had any other alternative.
the plea

colloquy,

there were numerous

opportunities

During
for -Mr.

Wadsworth to suggest to the Court that his plea was not voluntary,
but the record is devoid of any such suggestion.
The Court is unwilling to set aside an otherwise voluntaryappearing

plea

on

the

basis

of

unspecific

allegations
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STATE V. WADSWORTH
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

dissatisfaction with one's lawyer after the plea is taken, but
before sentencing is completed.

The Court can find no legitimate

basis to allow the defendant to withdraw the pleas that he has
previously entered, and accordingly the Motion to Withdraw the Plea
is denied.
The defendant is ordered to immediately, upon receipt of the
referral slip which is being sent to Mr. Goodall, defendant's
current counsel, contact Adult Probation and Parole and make an
appointment to meet with them, so that this Court might have a
presentence evaluation report for the sentencing which is scheduled
for Aiorilo

\

2 0 05, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.

No formal Order is necessary, this Memorandum Decision and
Order will stand as the Court's Order denying the defendant's
Motion to Withdraw his plea.
Dated this O

day of February, 2005'.'-:

IMOTHY R.«:, HANSON-; J
DISTRICT COURTr'JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order,
0

to

the

following, this

day of February, 2005:

William K. Kendall
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneytfor Plaintiff
111 E. Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Peter D. Goodall
Attorney for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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